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THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY REVOLUTION IN
FAMILY WEALTH TRANSMISSION
John H. Langbein*
The ancient field of trust-and-estate law has entered upon a period
of serious decline. In some law firms, even seasoned practitioners have
begun to diversify away from the field. In leading circles of the trust-
and-estate bar, there is now open discussion of diminishing clientele,
difficulty in billing for legal services at rates comparable to the rates
for other specialties, and the reluctance of new associates to enter the
field. I
Although it has been fashionable to attribute this decline to the
dramatic 1981 revision of the federal transfer taxes,2 which effectively
relieved the middle classes from entanglement with the estate tax, the
theme of this article is that the phenomenon has causes far more
profound. The decline of the probate bar reflects the decline of pro-
bate. The decline of probate has two quite different dimensions. One
is the much-remarked rise of the nonprobate system. Financial in-
termediaries operate a noncourt system for transferring account bal-
ances and other property on death with little or no lawyerly
participation. I shall recur to that subject in Part IV.
The decline of probate has another dimension that has not been
well understood. Fundamental changes in the very nature of wealth
have radically altered traditional patterns of family wealth transmis-
sion, increasing the importance of lifetime transfers and decreasing the
importance of wealth transfer on death.
In this article I shall be concerned with private-sector wealth.
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1. See, ag., A. FORGER & M. HECKSCHER, THE TRUSTS AND ESTATES LAWYER IN To-
DAY'S LAW FIRM: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL; OR THE T AND E LAWYER: AN ENDAN-
GERED SPEciEs? B-1, B-2 to B-3 (American College of Probate Counsel, 1987 Annual Meeting)
(seminar outline).
2. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, Title IV, §§ 401-
442; see generally Dodge, The Taxation of Wealth and Wealth Transfers: Where Do We Go After
ERTA?, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 738 (1982).
3. More than twenty years ago in a notable law review article, Charles Reich called attention
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Into the eighteenth century, land was the dominant form of wealth. 4
The technological forces that broke up older family-centered modes of
economic organization called forth two new forms of private-sector
wealth. One category is what we today callfinancial assets - that is,
stocks, bonds, bank deposits, mutual fund shares, insurance contracts,
and the like - which now comprise the dominant form of wealth.
The other great form of modem wealth is what the economists call
human capital. It is the skills and knowledge that lie at the root of
advanced technological life.
The main purpose of this article is to sound a pair of themes about
the ways in which these great changes in the nature of wealth have
become associated with changes of perhaps comparable magnitude in
the timing and in the character of family wealth transmission. My
first theme, developed in Part II, concerns human capital. Whereas of
old, wealth transmission from parents to children tended to center
upon major items of patrimony such as the family farm or the family
firm, today for the broad middle classes, wealth transmission centers
on a radically different kind of asset: the investment in skills. In con-
sequence, intergenerational wealth transmission no longer occurs pri-
marily upon the death of the parents, but rather, when the children are
growing up, hence, during the parents' lifetimes.
My other main theme, developed in Part III, arises from the awe-
some demographic transformation of modem life. For reasons that I
shall explore, those same parents who now make their main wealth
transfer to their children inter vivos are also living much longer. The
need to provide for the parents in their lengthy old age has put a huge
new claim on family wealth, a claim that necessarily reduces the resid-
uum that would otherwise have passed to survivors. A new institution
has arisen to help channel the process of saving and dissaving for old
age: the pension fund. The wealth of the private pension system5 con-
to one species of "new property" - claims to government largess, especially those we have come
to call entitlement programs, such as Social Security and Medicare. Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Reich's "new property" lies largely outside the scope of this article,
because the entitlements he identified lie mostly outside family dominion. You can neither give
nor sell nor bequeath your Social Security claims.
4. For example, data from Bucks County, Pennsylvania, indicates that realty constituted
more than half of the wealth in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century probated estates. C. SHAM-
MAS, M. SALMON & M. DAHLIN, INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 19 (1987) [hereinafter INHERITANCE IN AMERICA]. For data evidencing a spectacular
decline from colonial to modern times in the percentage of testators transmitting farms and
firms, see id. at 106, 191.
5. To be sure, the business of providing retirement income, both in money and in the form of
medical services, is the prototypical government transfer scheme. Social Security benefits epito-
mize Charles Reich's "new property." Reich, supra note 3, at 734. But for propertied people,
Social Security has always been something of a sideshow, and the recent revisions of the system
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sists almost entirely of financial assets. I shall emphasize a distinctive
attribute of pension wealth, namely, the bias toward annuitization.
When wealth is annuitized, virtually nothing is left for transfer on
death.
Thus, wealth transfer on death is ever less characteristic of family
wealth transmission. Part IV relates these great changes in family
property relations to the residual process of wealth transfer on death.
At the outset, I must emphasize a pair of exclusions from the
trends being described in this article. I shall be talking about the pat-
terns of wealth transmission that characterize the broad generality of
American wealth-holders - roughly, the upper third to upper half of
the populace. I mean, in short, the middle and especially the upper-
middle classes, which is to say, the mostly white-collar, technical,
managerial, and professional cohort. These people propel the knowl-
edge-based economy of our post-industrial age, and they command
much of its wealth. 6 The trends I shall be discussing have had less
influence upon the wealth 'transmission practices at the extremes of
our society - among the very rich and among the poor.
The modes of gratuitous transfer have never had much relevance
to the poor or near-poor. If you lack appreciable wealth, you will face
many problems in life, but one problem that you will be spared is the
question of how to transmit the wealth that you do not have.
At the other end of the spectrum, among those who populate the
uppermost tail of the wealth distribution - people somewhere within
the top one percent of wealth-holders - the trends that I shall be
discussing have also not been of great significance. I shall have more
to say about why the great forces canvassed in this article are largely
spent before they touch dynastic wealth.
I. PROLOGUE: FAMILY WEALTH THEN AND Now
It is often the case that the best way to broach the subject of the
new is to identify the important characteristics of the old. In this in-
stance, I begin by flipping the calendar backward a century and more,
to the days when Abraham Lincoln lived on the American prairie and
when his contemporaries were building the cities of the Atlantic sea-
board, the Great Lakes, and the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys. We
want to remind ourselves of some central traits of wealth holding and
wealth transmission in this period.
that have begun to tax the benefits received by comparatively affluent distributees confirm that
people of means will in the future have even less to expect from Social Security.
6. See text at notes 68-70 infra for discussion and interpretation of sector wealth data.
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A. Family Property Relations in the Last Century
The family was prototypically a unit of production. Nineteenth-
century America was overwhelmingly a nation of small farms. In the
towns and cities, the predominant economic entities were small-firm
producers and small shops. Farmers, artisans, and shopkeepers had in
common the tradition that the entire family worked in the enterprise.
In those circumstances, contemporaries had little occasion to distin-
guish between what we think of as earned income (income from one's
labor) and investment income (the return to property). The two in-
come streams were merged in a single endeavor. Both the generation
of the parents and the generation of the children looked to the farm or
the firm for their livelihood, with scant attention to idle accounting
questions about how much of their income to apportion to labor and
how much to property.
In emphasizing that the returns to labor and capital were compos-
ite, I do not mean that the property component was unimportant.
Property was desperately important. Ownership of a farm or a firm
rescued you from a mean life of stoop labor in someone else's field,
mill, or household. In former times, it was vastly harder to live by
your skills alone, without patrimony. Accordingly, people of means
aspired to nothing so much as to leave their children similarly ad-
vantaged. You hoped to transmit the farm or the firm, and thus in the
quaint phrase of the time, to make for your children "a provision in
life."
There was relatively little formal education.7 This was a low-tech
age, and the transmission of skills, like so much else, could still occur
within the family. You learned your trade alongside your parents and
your relations, in the fields, in the firm, or at the hearth. Put differ-
ently, the family was not only the primary unit of production, it was
the primary educational entity as well. Only a few crafts and learned
professions required external education; and even in those pursuits,
education was frequently assimilated to a domestic model through the
apprenticeship system of training.
Succession to ownership rights in this multigenerational enterprise
occurred upon death - that is, upon the death of the parents, typi-
cally of the father. Various familiar arrangements were made for the
widow, not only the common-law life estate known as dower, but also
life interests in fee or in trust that could provide a larger fraction than
7. Little by comparison with today, not necessarily by comparison with education in the Old




dower and that could extend beyond realty.8 But the tendency both in
intestacy and for testate estates was to limit the widow to a life inter-
est,9 in order to assure continuity of the enterprise in the hands of the
next generation, whose members had already been long employed in
the enterprise.
Notice in this connection that widowhood was materially less com-
mon than today. I do not happen to have American data on this
point, but I can report some German numbers gathered by a leading
German scholar, Dieter Leipold. He found that as late as 1876-1880,
for each 100 marriages that ended in death, the female survived in
56.5%. By the year 1965, females were the survivor in 70% of mar-
riages ending in death.10 Thus, over the century, female survivorship
expanded from a modest probability to a probability that is better than
two-to-one. The reasons, of course, are not hard to discern. There has
been a precipitous decline in the rate of mortality associated with
childbearing. Furthermore, while both sexes have benefitted from
huge increases in longevity across the century, the advantage in favor
of women has consistently expanded.11 Whereas spousal succession
today is overwhelmingly a widow's business, in earlier times the wife
was materially less likely to survive her husband than she is today; and
when she did survive him, it was not likely to be for very long.
Accordingly, succession to the family farm or family firm typically
occurred on the father's death. There was no reason for him to sur-
render dominion over the family patrimony inter vivos. Ownership
until death reinforced parental control over the extended family and
over its collective enterprise. Remember that although wealth trans-
mission occurred on death, death occurred very much earlier than it
does today. That is to say, succession on death occurred when both
the parents and the children were younger than we now expect. This
8. In samples of colonial Virginia wills from the period 1660-1719, the percentage leaving a
life estate to the widow varied from a low of 21.1% to a high of 50%. Deen, Patterns of Testa.
tion: Four Tidewater Counties in Colonial Virginia, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 154, 160 (1972).
Lawrence Friedman studied a sample of New Jersey wills from the second half of the nineteenth
century. He concluded that, by comparison with modem practice, "[p]erhaps the most striking
feature of the [New Jersey] wills is the prevalence of trusts and future interests." Friedman,
Patterns of Testation in the 19th Century: A Study of Essex County (New Jersey) Wills, 8 Am. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 34, 41 (1964). "In 1850 the number of wills which made at least some non-fee
disposition for the widow was more than twice that of wills which made fee dispositions only."
Id. at 42-43. By 1900, this pattern had changed markedly. "Thus the earlier the will in [Fried-
man's sample], the more likely it was to make non-fee gifts to the wife." Id. at 43.
9. See INHERITANCE IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 32-33 (intestacy and forced share), 51-53
(testamentary provision in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, 1685-1756).
10. Leipold, Wandlungen in den Grundlagen des Erbrechts?, 180 ARCHLY FOR DIE CIVILIS-
TISCHE PRAXIS 160, 186 (1980).
11. Id. at 187. For American data on the greater enhancement of female life expectancy in
the twentieth century, see text at notes 58-59 infra.
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difference is, of course, no mystery. It results from the awesome
change in life expectancy over the past century, a fascinating subject
about which more is said in Part III. Thus, even though wealth trans-
fer in the previous century tended to occur on death rather than inter
vivos, decedents were less often elderly. The successors were typically
young adults, as compared to the middle-aged children who typically
succeed when parents die in modem circumstances.
Finally, to complete this snapshot of important traits of nine-
teenth-century wealth transmission patterns, I wish to say something
about the diminished expectations of daughters. Perhaps the easy way
to make this point is to remind you how often you have come across
some family firm from earlier times in which the father associated the
son or sons in the firm's name - for example, Steinway & Sons; but
you have not seen firms called Steinway & Daughters. Although there
were many exceptions, the wealth transmission process tended to favor
the male line.12 The firm or the farm had to be worked. Except when
a family had only a daughter or daughters, continuity within the patri-
mony emphasized the son.13
B. Family Property Relations in Modern Times
In the late twentieth century, the family has in general ceased to be
an important unit of production. To be sure, you can still find dribbles
of cottage industry in America, and there is still a fair amount of
Mom-and-Pop retailing, but in the main the production and sale of
goods and services has forever left the home. The technological so-
phistication and marketing complexity of modern modes of produc-
tion and distribution impose enormous capital requirements. Village
12. For evidence of paternal "discrimination" against daughters in a smallish sample of
Bucks County, Pennsylvania, probated estates from the period 1685-1756, see INHERITANCE IN
AMERICA, supra note 4, at 44-47. Colonial Virginia data shows that the devise of fee-simple land
to daughters was a "rarity"; daughters were much more likely to be devised household person-
alty and farm animals. Deen, supra note 8, at 159-60. A study of 636 Wisconsin farms that
remained within the family (that is, were transmitted to descendants of the first owner) during
the century from 1848 to 1948 discerns a strong preference for sons over daughters. The 636
farms were transferred 1,458 times. Of these transfers, 74.6% were to sons, 3.6% were to sons
and daughters jointly, 14.5% were to daughters, and 7.3% were to relatives other than children.
Tarver, Intra-Family Farm Succession Practices, 17 RURAL Soc. 266, 267-69 (1952). "[A]
farmer usually finds it more appropriate to transfer his farm to a son, who may have farmed with
him for several years, than to a daughter and son-in-law." Id. at 269.
13. In emphasizing this reason for preferring the male line, I do not wish to imply that it was
the sole factor. Conceptions that we now find archaic about the needs and roles of women were
also involved. But it is instructive to see that in INHERITANCE IN AMERICA, supra note 4,
(which is fully informed by modern feminist sensibilities), the authors point out that by the end
of the nineteenth century, when the transmission of family enterprise had become markedly less
common, id. at 106, the treatment of sons and daughters in the authors' Bucks County, Penn-
sylvania, sample became "nearly identical." Id. at 108.
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blacksmiths cannot manufacture automobiles, airplanes, and oil rigs.
The village entrepreneur can still sell a screwdriver or make a
hamburger, but the evidence is overwhelming that the customer
mostly prefers to patronize K-Mart or McDonald's. Thus, the charac-
teristic unit of production in our age is corporate rather than domestic,
it is the share company.
These trends extend to farming as well. American agriculture is
ever more technology driven and capital intensive. It has become a
byword that we live in an era of corporate agriculture. Family farms
still exist in America, indeed, in some farming areas it would be fair to
say that family farms remain characteristic. But a large fraction of
them are hobby farms, secondary enterprises conducted by people
whose main livelihood derives from employment outside the home.
As farms have grown in size and productivity, an astonishing agricul-
tural depopulation has occurred. In what used to be a nation of farm-
ers, we are now fed by a mere 5% of the population, down from 44%
in 1880,14 and it should be remembered that these people are not only
feeding the rest of us, they are running our largest export industry as
well.
Thus, in the main, we neither farm nor manufacture at home. The
family has undergone a specialization of function. In economic terms,
the family remains a unit of consumption but no longer a unit of pro-
duction. Enterprise is organized outside the home, and the worker
now leaves the home for his employment. Such a worker contributes
his labor to his employment, but he no longer supplies the plant and
equipment as he did in the bygone day of the family enterprise. The
reason that most workers use external capital is, of course, closely con-
nected to the technological and marketing forces that have magnified
the size and complexity of the productive processes, the forces that
drove the worker out of the home in the first place. Modern modes of
enterprise are capital intensive. The blacksmith could afford his anvil,
but we cannot expect the autoworker to supply his factory or the air-
plane pilot to bring along his own Boeing 747.
The ever-larger capital requirements of technologically advanced
enterprise required modes of financing that exceeded the capabilities of
the family. Ownership of a small firm or a small farm could lie within
the scope of family-based capital accumulation and capital transmis-
sion, but we understand why IBM, General Electric, and AT&T can-
not be family firms. 15 The corporate form arose to facilitate the
14. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 ser. K 1-
16, at 457 (1975) [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS).
15. See Daniel Bell's remarks about the "breakup of family capitalism" at the end of the
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pooling and allocation of capital, as did the specialized institutions of
finance. In the late twentieth century we recognize three dominant
modes of financial intermediation: first, the corporation, and with it,
the securities industry that makes the market in corporate shares and
corporate debt; second, banking - commercial, investment, and sav-
ings and loan; and third, the insurance industry. All three were primi-
tive in antebellum America. 16 Not only have these financial
intermediaries now displaced the family's role as the unit of capital
accumulation, they have also created the new forms of wealth in finan-
cial assets - the various securities, depositary claims, and other con-
tract rights.
These instruments of financial intermediation now absorb the sav-
ings that the family previously devoted to the family enterprise. Be-
cause family wealth is no longer retained but rather invested
externally, it now takes the form of claims on outside enterprises.
These financial assets have become the characteristic form of transmis-
sible wealth. It is the stuff of the financial pages. As Roscoe Pound
said in an arresting dictum, "Wealth, in a commercial age, is made up
largely of promises." 17 I shall have more to say about how the preva-
lence of financial assets has altered the patterns of family wealth trans-
mission. For the present, however, I want to direct attention to that
other species of new property that is associated with the breakup of
the family as a unit of production: human capital.
II. WEALTH TRANSFERS THROUGH HUMAN CAPITAL
The same underlying technological and economic forces that
caused the dissolution of family-based enterprise have also stripped the
family of much of its role as an educational institution. This develop-
ment, which is in a sense quite obvious to us all, has had enormous
implications for family wealth transmission, implications that have not
been adequately appreciated.
It is a truism that a technological age requires a technologically
proficient workforce. The awesome expansion of human knowledge
nineteenth century, when bankers and later corporate managers gained control of large enter-
prises. D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 40-42 (1960).
16. See R. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855
3-7, 191-223 (1982) (spread of industry-specific general incorporation statutes in New York in
1840s and 1850s). The marketability of corporate shares increased significantly from the 1890s.
See Navin & Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902, 29 Bus. HIST.
REV. 105 (1955). For an overview of the history of American banking, see Green, Financial
Intermediaries, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 707 (G. Porter ed.
1980). A recent study of the history of the life insurance industry is V. ZELIZER, MORALS AND
MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1979).
17. R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236 (1922).
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over the past century and more has made the family obsolete as a re-
pository and transfer agent for this huge range of knowledge. In olden
times, I have said, you learned your trade at home and hearth, or else
in apprenticeship to a neighbor. Only a handful of callings required
training beyond these domestic patterns. Today, by contrast, we have
gone so far in the opposite direction - toward externalizing education
- that we even send people outside the home to prepare for life in the
home. (I refer not simply to the study of what is called home econom-
ics, but to our ever-greater reliance upon the schools for basic
acculturation.)
A. Educational Expenditure
The educational demands of modern economic life have become
immense, and so has the cost of providing children with this educa-
tional endowment. A central thesis of this article is that paying for
education has become the characteristic mode of intergenerational
wealth transmission for most American families.
Look at the statistics in order to get a sense of the underlying mag-
nitudes. Total expenditures for formal education in the United States
in 1840 have been calculated at $9.2 million.18 This sum increased
over the nineteenth century, a period of relatively low inflation, to
stand at $289.6 million in 1900.19 By 1959 the figure had reached
$23.9 billion, which amounted to 4.8% of gross national product.
20
Less than thirty years later, in the 1986-1987 academic year, the total
expenditure on formal education stood at $282.1 billion, a figure that
represented 7% of gross national product. Of these amounts, 60%
went to fund primary and secondary education, 40% went to higher
education.2
1
While the official educational statistics are valuable for conveying a
general sense of the magnitudes, they conceal many subtle issues of
definition and measurement. Many sins pass under the label of educa-
tion. Not every course in basketweaving deserves to be reckoned as
investment in human capital. On the other hand, much of our finan-
cial investment in our children takes forms that, somewhat arbitrarily,
fall outside the category of formal education. If you take your chil-
dren to a nature preserve or on a tour of French cathedrals, that's
18. Fishlow, Levels of Nineteenth-Century American Investment in Education, 26 J. ECON.
HIsT. 418, 420 (1966). See id. at 431 for inflation-adjusted figures in 1958 dollars.
19. Id. at 420, 431.
20. CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1987, at 24
(1987) [hereinafter EDUCATION DIGEST].
21. Id. at 4, 25.
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private recreation, whereas when some educational institution takes
your kid square dancing, that's education. Indeed, as my colleagues
Walter Blum and the late Harry Kalven pointed out in a celebrated
book some thirty years ago, the most important inheritance of all -
the thing that decisively advantages middle-class children - is the
cultural bequest from their parents.22 That parental transfer of lan-
guage, of values, and of psychological well-being sets the stage for all
the formal learning and achievements of later years. None of that gets
captured in the educational statistics. Nevertheless, once due allow-
ance is made for the shortcomings of what the statisticians deem to be
education, the numbers are so enormous that they bespeak an enter-
prise of daunting importance.
In 1870 only 2% of the population was graduating from high
school; by 1970 the figure was 75.6%.23 In 1870 institutions of higher
learning in the United States conferred a total of 9,372 degrees, of
which 9,371 were bachelor's degrees and exactly one was a doctorate.
In 1970 the total number of degrees conferred showed an increase of
more than a hundredfold over 1870. The figure stood at 1,065,000, of
which almost 30,000 were Ph.D. or equivalent degrees. 24 College en-
rollments as a percentage of the college age population reached 12.5%
in 1946,25 29.6% in 1970, and 31.3% in 1985.26 As recently as 1940,
only 4.6% of the American population had completed four or more
years of university study. By 1985, almost 20% (19.4%, to be precise)
had done S0.27
Economists who have examined this gigantic education industry
have increasingly been of the view that expenditures on education
ought not to be viewed as a simple consumption expense, like money
spent on corn flakes or handkerchiefs. 28 Rather, they see educational
expenditure as an investment, closely akin to conventional investment
in plant, equipment, and inventory. Education produces skills, and
skills are as much an input in the productive process as machines.
Economists now routinely liken these skills to capital, the species of
capital that they call human capital. Modern productive processes are
22. W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 88 (1953).
23. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 14, ser. H 598-601, at 379.
24. Id., ser. H 751-765, at 385-86.
25. Id., ser. H 700-715, at 383.
26. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1987
118, table 192 (1987) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (school enrollment figures for those
18-24 years old).
27. Id. at 121, table 197.
28. See, eg., Campbell & Siegel, The Demand for Higher Education in the United States,
1919-1964, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 482 (1967).
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skill-driven. Whether we speak of new fields like aeronautics or an-
cient ones like health care, the story is the same. While plant and
equipment become increasingly sophisticated - robotics and com-
puters and CAT scanners and all that - the skills of the workforce
become still more decisive. Human capital thus substitutes for nonhu-
man capital. Skill embodies knowledge, and new knowledge not only
displaces old knowledge, it displaces plant and equipment as well.
Think of the advance in medical science that made polio a preventable
disease and consigned the iron lung industry to the scrapheap: Skill
displaced machines.
Human capital, being literally embodied in mortals, is distin-
guished from physical capital by the frailty of the human condition.
Human capital dies with the holder and thus needs to be created
afresh in each generation. Of course, the highly transitory quality of
human capital is really more a difference of degree than of kind. Ma-
chines and structures also fall apart or become obsolete, which is why
we systematically account for the artifacts of physical capital by means
of depreciation schedules.
Careful econometric study has documented that human capital has
steadily increased over the twentieth century as a fraction of total cap-
ital and as a fraction of gross national product. The percent of GNP
spent on both education and on job training grew by 80% from 1929
to 1969, in which year it stood at 15.4% of GNP.29 A recent set of
calculations "implies that education costs society approximately as
much as investment in nonresidential physical capital."'30
There is no mystery about who has been paying the bill for this
vast expansion of education. Even allowing for some scholarships,
loans, and student labor, the main burden falls upon the parents. In-
deed, even childless people pay substantial sums in taxes to support
the public educational establishment. But for present purposes, the fo-
cus is upon propertied families who are raising children.
My thesis is quite simple, and, I hope, quite intuitive. I believe
that, in striking contrast to the patterns of last century and before, in
modem times the business of educating children has become the main
occasion for intergenerational wealth transfer. Of old, parents were
mainly concerned to transmit the patrimony - prototypically the
farm or the firm, but more generally, that "provision in life" that res-
cued children from the harsh fate of being a mere laborer. In today's
economic order, it is education more than property, the new human
29. J. KENDRICK, THE FORMATION AND STOCKS OF TOTAL CAPITAL 71 (1976).
30. Johnson, Investment in and Returns from Education, in THE LEVEL AND COMPOSITION
OF HOUSEHOLD SAVING (P. Hendershott ed. 1985).
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capital rather than the old physical capital, that similarly advantages a
child.
We know that income levels correlate powerfully with education.
In 1985 the median annual income of full-time male workers aged
twenty-five and over who had completed some years of high school but
had not graduated was under $20,000; for those who had completed
four years of college the figure was above $30,000; and for those with
more than four years of college, the figure approached $40,000. The
comparable earnings figures for female workers were lower, but differ-
ences in educational attainment among women produced similar dis-
parities in favor of the well educated.
31
Family wealth and its corollary, family income, are crucial deter-
minants of access to education. A sociologist of education recently
summed up the data in the following way: "The amount of schooling
that individuals obtain and their school continuation decisions are
strongly affected by characteristics of their families. Persons whose
parents have more schooling, higher income, and better jobs; whose
families are smaller; and who were raised in urban areas typically ob-
tain more schooling than persons from less-advantaged back-
grounds."
32
The process of delivering educational advantage to children begins
when they are very young. There has been a huge increase in formal
preschool education in recent decades. 33 In the years of primary and
secondary education, propertied parents strive to locate in suitable
school districts, or to send their children to private schools. By the
way, the distinction between private and public schools is far less
meaningful than might appear at first glance. Many of those distin-
guished suburban school districts that represent the high-water mark
of quality in our public school tradition are in truth better understood
as private schools with tax-deductible tuition - the tuition taking the
form of relatively high real estate taxes that are deductible against in-
come taxes.34 Parents tend to move into these school districts when
31. EDUCATION DIGEST, supra note 20, at 283. The Wall Street Journal recently reported
data indicating much wider income disparities across the categories of educational attainment.
Average monthly income for a person with only a high-school diploma is shown as $415; a
vocational degree, $990; a bachelor's degree, $1,540; a doctoral degree, $2,747; and a professional
degree, $3,439. Wall St. 3., Mar. 17, 1988, at 21, col.3.
32. Mare, Trends in Schooling: Demography, Performance, and Organization, 453 ANNALS
96, 101 (1981).
33. EDUCATION DIGEST, supra note 20, at 4, 12.
34. See Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519, 1574-75




they have school-age children, and to move out when they no longer
need the schools.
And then there is college. The federal government's Digest of Edu-
cation Statistics 1987 reports that the average annual charge for tui-
tion, room, and board for undergraduates in the 1985-1986 academic
year was $3,640 at public colleges and $8,870 at private colleges.35
Because these numbers are averages, which lump low-cost local insti-
tutions with elite schools, they understate the bills that parents face
when they send children to the major universities. At the premier pri-
vate universities, the bill for tuition, room, and board now exceeds
$15,000 a year; travel and incidentals can easily bring the figure to
$20,000. In the graduate and professional schools, the price tag is
higher still. This year, most of the major private law schools are
charging about $13,000 in tuition alone. Tuition, fees, books, and sup-
plies at the University of Chicago Law School this academic year are
estimated to cost $13,550. At Chicago, we project total annual ex-
penses for an unmarried law student at more than $21,000 per year,
which puts the effective price tag of a three-year Chicago degree at
about $65,000.36 By the way, it costs us a further $35,000 to deliver
that degree to the student, money that comes from endowment in-
come, a trickle of foundation and government grants, and a torrent of
alumni support.
A story in Newsweek in May of 1987 used figures on the annual
cost of undergraduate education at Johns Hopkins. The $15,410 that
Johns Hopkins charged in 1987 for tuition, room, and board consti-
tuted 31% of a family income of $50,000 per year. By contrast, the
$2,000 that Johns Hopkins charged in 1960 represented only 15% of
the inflation-adjusted equivalent family income for 1960, which was
$13,505. 37
Now it is quite obvious that very few families can afford to pay
31% of family income, or anything near it, on what we would call -
in an accounting sense - a current basis. That is especially true when
the family has more than one child in the educational mill at the same
time. For most families, therefore, these education expenses represent
capital transfers in a quite literal sense: The money comes from sav-
ings, that is, from the family's capital; or debt is assumed, meaning
that the money is borrowed from the family's future capital.
The guidelines that the universities use for calculating financial aid
35. EDUCATION DIGEST, supra note 20, at 117.
36. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, ANNOUNCEMENTS 52 (1987-1988).
37. Fuming over College Costs, NEWSWEEK, May 18, 1987, at 66 [hereinafter NEWSWEEK].
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are quite explicit about taking into account all family wealth, not just
current income, in deciding what fraction of the education bill the
family should be made to pay. At the law school level for example, we
are served by an organization called the Graduate and Professional
School Financial Aid Service, known under its repulsive acronym of
GAPSFAS, which analyzes the family financial statements of appli-
cants. GAPSFAS guidelines treat as available for defraying educa-
tional expenses not only the family's liquid assets, but also the family's
home equity and the net worth of any family farm or family business.
GAPSFAS publishes tables that indicate what percentage of home eq-
uity or of business or farm net worth should be utilized before the
student qualifies for financial aid. These tables resemble the progres-
sive bracket tables in the Internal Revenue Code: the greater the fam-
ily wealth, the higher the fraction that the parents are expected to
transfer to the child in support of the child's education.
38
The same Newsweek article that discussed the education cost
figures from Johns Hopkins recounted the saga of a parent named
C.Y. Lu, who presently has the financial misfortune to have one son
attending Princeton while the other is at the Harvard Law School.
Mr. Lu is reported to have sold off investments, taken out educational
loans, and refinanced his home mortgage by $60,000, in order to raise
a total of $140,000. Mr. Lu is quoted as saying, "I've told my sons,
your education is going to be your inheritance.
'39
There in Mr. Lu's words you see my theme encapsulated. Educa-
tion is displacing inheritance, lifetime transfers are displacing succes-
sion on death. Back in the nineteenth century or earlier, Mr. Lu
would have husbanded his wealth and left it to his sons at his death.
Today, in mid-life, he cashes out and goes into debt in order to fork
over his savings to Princeton and Harvard.
Nobody forces Mr. Lu to do this. It was quite open to him to say
to his two sons, "Boys, I'll make you a deal. I'll buy you out of those
admission letters from Princeton and Harvard. Stay away from those
cauldrons of red ink, and content yourselves with attending the com-
munity college down the road - or better yet, go right to work in an
accessible career like pumping gas at the corner filling station. Then,
I'll have $140,000 more in family wealth that I can invest through
Merrill Lynch. It will compound and be available for you on my
death." Well, we all know that virtually no parent behaves that way.
38. See H. FLAMER, D. HORCH & J. BRUNO, MEASURING THE FINANCIAL STATUS OF
GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL STUDENTS: GAPSFAS THEORY AND COMPUTATION PROCE-
DURES, 1987-88 AWARD YEAR 9, 22-23, 48 (1987).
39. NEWSWEEK, supra note 37, at 67.
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Parents understand full well the point that the economists have been
demonstrating with their studies of human capital. Those degrees
from Princeton and Harvard are superior investments when compared
to any class of financial assets, by virtue of a very conventional test:
The degrees produce a far larger income stream.
Mr. Lu happened to have sons, but if his children had been daugh-
ters, his financial predicament would scarcely have improved. One of
the grand American social achievements, in which we led the world,
was to extend the opportunity for formal education to women. That
trend was epitomized in the nineteenth century by the proliferation of
women's colleges. Today, more women than men attend college.40
Accordingly, the twentieth-century revolution in family wealth trans-
mission may ultimately come to be understood as having been even
more consequential for women than for men.41
From the proposition that the main parental wealth transfer to
children now takes place inter vivos, there follows a corollary: Chil-
dren of propertied parents are much less likely to expect an inheri-
tance. Whereas of old, children did expect the transfer of the farm or
firm, today's children expect help with educational expenses, but they
do not depend upon parental wealth transfer at death. Lengthened life
expectancies mean that the life-spans of the parents overlap the life-
spans of their adult children for much longer than used to be. Parents
now live to see their children reaching peak earnings potential, and
those earnings often exceed what the parents were able to earn. To-
day, children are typically middle-aged when the survivor of their two
parents dies, and middle-aged children are far less likely to be finan-
cially needy. It is still the common practice within middle- and upper-
middle-class families for parents to leave to their children (or
grandchildren) most or all of any property that happens to remain
when the parents die, but there is no longer a widespread sense of
parental responsibility to abstain from consumption in order to trans-
mit an inheritance.
B. Consequences for the Ethos of Inheritance
At the outset of this article, I cautioned that the revolution in fam-
ily wealth transmission would be seen to be less significant for dynastic
wealth holders. School bills make little dent in large fortunes. There
are intrinsic limits to how much education an individual can absorb,
40. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 26, at 137, tables 231-232.
41. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
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and those limits are reached long before the holders of great wealth
would notice.
Nevertheless, there is a deeper sense in which the forces that have
transformed the patterns of wealth transmission for the broad middle
classes have also touched the holders of great wealth. The new pattern
has become a social norm, a norm so powerful that it has begun to
chip away at the ethos of older notions of inheritance.
This is a phenomenon that I first became aware of as a result of
talking with practicing estate planners. Recently, I noticed Fortune
magazine running a story on it. Fortune reported on the thinking of
some extremely wealthy people who planned to leave their children
only token inheritances. The story led off with the views of Warren
Buffett, chairman of the Berkshire Hathaway holding company, whose
personal wealth is estimated at $1.5 billion. Buffett is quoted as ex-
plaining why he plans to leave each of his three children only a few
hundred thousand dollars. Having put the children through college,
Buffett says he expects them "to carve out their own place in this
world." It would be "harmful" and "antisocial" to set up his children
with "a lifetime supply of food stamps just because they came out of
the right womb." 42 Buffett's $1.5 billion will go to charity. So will the
$50 million fortune of a New York entrepreneur named Eugene Lang,
who sent his three children to college, gave each "a nominal sum"
after college, and plans to disinherit them. He explained to the For-
tune reporter: "To me inheritance dilutes the motivation that most
young people have to fulfill the best that is in them. I want to give my
kids the tremendous satisfaction of making it on their own." 43
People like Messrs. Buffett and Lang are quite exceptional. Most
people of great means prefer to leave most of their wealth to their
descendants, hoping to shape the younger generations so that the
wealth will be used responsibly. The hostility towards conventional
succession expressed by Messrs. Buffett and Lang is noteworthy not
because such hostility is prevalent, but simply because it would have
been inconceivable a century or more ago. Can we imagine the twelfth
Earl of Carlisle arranging for the dissipation of the family seat, in or-
der to stimulate the thirteenth Earl to the challenge of reacquiring it?
Messrs. Buffett and Lang are voicing an attitude toward conven-
tional wealth transmission that is not only quite exceptional, it is his-
torically very recent and also very American. Behind it, I think, are
two novel ideas. One is the assumption that wealth is largely fungible,
42. Kirkland, Should You Leave It All to the Children?, FORTUNE, Sept. 29, 1986, at 18.
43. Id. at 21.
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that there is no great sentimental attachment nor any particular social
significance to the family's existing patrimony. That is why Mr. Buf-
fett could liken his fortune to a pile of food stamps, and why Mr. Lang
could hope that his children would experience the satisfaction of
"making it on their own." By it, he means, something like it, but not
the identical property. This notion that wealth is fungible is an idea
that fits the new forms of wealth better than the old, an idea that fits
American circumstances better than English or European. You're
much more likely to be sentimental about your ancestors' manor
house than about the family's portfolio of marketable securities.
Further, the disdain for customary modes of wealth transfer that
Messrs. Buffett and Lang are voicing presupposes that these gentlemen
have already achieved for their children the characteristic wealth
transfer of modem times, the investment in human capital through
education. More and more, Americans expect personal wealth to take
the form of earned income, that is, we expect it to be a return on
human capital. Messrs. Buffett and Lang have taken that expectation
to its limit; in their eyes, conventional wealth transfer has lost its legit-
imacy. The esteem associated with holding property really now ap-
plies only to earned income, to property that embodies the fruits of
human capital. In this sense, the revolution in family wealth transmis-
sion, which is overwhelmingly an event of the broad middle classes,
touches even the holders of great wealth.
C. Europe and England: A Comparative Aside
The substitution of human capital for older forms of property is
less evident in the patterns of family wealth transmission in Europe
than in the United States, even though the underlying technological
and economic forces have been broadly comparable on both sides of
the Atlantic. The main explanation surely has to do with differences
in educational finance. As a generality, the Europeans have socialized
education and educational finance much more than we.
England represents something of a middle case, because of the
enormous importance of private, pre-university schooling in the Eng-
lish system. Propertied English families are just as prepared to sacri-
fice for Eton or Winchester as Americans are for Stanford or
Dartmouth. On the other hand, this kind of private schooling is unim-
portant on the Continent; and both in England and on the Continent,
the university systems are all but wholly socialized. Tuition is mostly
negligible, and because the state tends to suppress quality differentials
among universities, students are more likely than in the United States
to live at home and attend the local institutions.
[V/ol. 86:722
Family Wealth Transmission
For Europeans, therefore, educational finance is not the cataclys-
mic event in family fortunes that it is for Americans. I do not want to
overstate this point. It is far costlier for a European family to keep a
child at home and in university than to send him out into the
workforce. That is one reason why, there as here, levels of participa-
tion in higher education correlate strongly with levels of family in-
come. There as here, education is costly, and paying for it means that
less wealth will be available for other purposes. But in Europe the
intermediation of the state distorts the process more and makes the
phenomenon more difficult to discern. In Europe more of the wealth
transfer becomes a branch of tax economics. Europeans pay materi-
ally higher taxes than Americans, and these taxes, which subsidize
higher education as well as many other services, necessarily result in
lower marginal incomes and lower accumulations of family wealth
than would otherwise be the case. This is, of course, a difference of
degree rather than of kind, since most of American education, both
preparatory and university, is publically operated and tax-subsidized.
But as is often the case in matters of economics, differences at the
margin matter a great deal. The United States is unique among ad-
vanced countries in the extent to which educational finance remains
privatized, especially the kinds of education that are most sought-after
by the upper-middle classes.44
III. THE PENSION REVOLUTION
The other great chapter in the saga of fundamental change in fam-
ily wealth transmission being told in this article concerns the phenom-
enon of retirement and the rise of the private pension system. Pension
funds are another artifact of the new forms of wealth that arose in
consequence of the breakup of older, family-centered modes of pro-
duction. Neither on the prairie nor in the cities of Abraham Lincoln's
day had anybody ever heard of a pension fund. Your life expectancy
was such that you were unlikely to need much in the way of retirement
income. If you did chance to outlive your period of productive labor,
you were in general cared for within the family.
Not only is the need for a retirement income stream relatively re-
cent, but so too is the mode of wealth that now supplies it. Pension
funds are composed almost entirely of financial assets - the instru-
ments of financial intermediation - that distinctively modern form of
property that was still of peripheral importance in the last century.
44. See EDUCATION DIGEST, supra note 20, at 120, for percentage of American university
budgets deriving from tuition revenue.
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As late as World War II, the private pension system was minus-
cule.45 Today, the assets of nonfederal pension plans (that is, private
plans plus the pension funds of state and local government employees)
total approximately two trillion dollars.46 As of 1984, pension funds
owned 22.8% of equity securities in the United States and about half
of all corporate debt.47 For many middle- and especially upper-mid-
dle-class families, pension wealth is their largest asset. But pension
wealth has traits that mark it off sharply from traditional property,
especially when we look at it from the standpoint of family wealth
transmission.
A. The Enhancement of Life Expectancy
The way to begin thinking about the pension revolution is to grasp
the magnitude of the underlying demographic phenomena that
brought it about. Life expectancy a hundred years ago was about
forty-five years. Today, it is seventy-five years and climbing.
48
Behind the awesome spurt in life expectancy over the last century
or so is a phenomenon that has been called "the elimination of prema-
ture disease." 49 In a nutshell, the insight is that diseases belong in two
categories - the infectious or acute diseases that we have now largely
banished from the mortality tables; and those diseases of old age that
appear to set intrinsic limits on human longevity. Some researchers
think that they see age eighty-five as the approximate eventual norm of
the human life span. In 1980 white females were living to within seven
years of that ideal. Three of those seven years of what is called "aver-
age premature death" are accounted for by violent death - automo-
bile accidents, bathtub falls, and so forth. Thus, from the medical
viewpoint, it is being said that the "task of eliminating premature
death ... has been largely accomplished." 50
To understand what modem sanitation and modem medicine have
achieved, it is instructive to consider the case of tuberculosis, which in
the year 1840 was the leading cause of death in the United States. As
late as the year 1900, one American in five hundred died from tubercu-
losis every year. 5' By 1970, mortality from tuberculosis had decreased
45. See W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 27-67 (1976).
46. Pension Assets Total Nearly $2 Trillion, 13 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1918-19 (Nov. 17, 1986).
47. R. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 123-24 (1986).
48. See Dychtwald, The Aging of America: Overview, in WELLNESS AND HEALTH PROMO-
TION FOR THE ELDERLY 1 (K. Dychtwald ed. 1986).
49. Fries & Crapo, The Elimination of Premature Disease, in WELLNESS AND HEALTH PRO-
MOTION FOR THE ELDERLY, supra note 48, at 19.
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id. at 19.
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by over 99%.52 Many factors account for this decline in tuberculosis
mortality rates, including pasteurization of milk, inspection of cattle,
improvement in nutrition and in living conditions, and the quarantine
of diseased persons. "Epidemiologists are fond of pointing out that
about nine-tenths of the present improvement... occurred even before
the discovery of any drugs that could kill the tuberculosis germ.
Streptomycin was the first such drug, and it was first used in the late
1940s." 5
3
Declines in the mortality rates from other dread infectious diseases
have been as dramatic. "Smallpox is eliminated entirely. Paralytic
polio, diphtheria, tetanus, typhoid ... and whooping cough have been
reduced to negligible levels. Deaths from measles and from strepto-
coccal infections have been eliminated, even though the diseases them-
selves still occur.' ' 54 Against the power of penicillin syphilis can no
longer kill. "All these conditions have declined over 99 percent, and in
some cases, 100 percent[.]
''55
Part of what makes the AIDS epidemic so haunting is that it has
happened against this background of utter triumph over earlier forms
of infectious disease. What we cannot yet know is whether AIDS will
remain an exception in a world where other infectious diseases remain
insignificant; or whether the elimination of the ancient infectious dis-
eases has set the stage for the development of new ones that, like
AIDS, are resistant to the environmental measures and to the antibiot-
ics that vanquished the old ones.
Roughly three of every four deaths in the United States today stem
from three causes: cardiovascular disease, cancer, and automobile ac-
cidents. The prominence of cardiovascular disease and cancer as kill-
ers is related to the elimination of infectious diseases. "Survival from
the diseases that used to kill early in life allowed the illnesses that
occur later in life to increase in frequency as a cause of death."
'5 6
I have travelled (I hope not detoured) into this demographic data,
because I think that without it one cannot really grasp what the pen-
52. Id. at 19-20.
53. Id. at 20.
54. Id. at 21.
55. Id. For pneumonia and influenza,
the reduction has been only 85 percent. However, this statistic hides an equally dramatic
result. Pneumonia and influenza deaths now occur almost exclusively among infirm, very
old, or already ill individuals. Such deaths, which are attributed to a germ, in fact result
from diminished defense mechanisms and lost organ reserve. Deaths from these conditions
in otherwise healthy individuals in the early and middle years of life have declined by the
same 99 percent as the other infectious diseases.
Id.
56. Id. at 22.
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sion revolution is all about. The pension fund is a direct response to
the new demographics, in the setting of the new property. That point
is best made if we return for a moment to our baseline in antebellum
America, in order to see how the phenomenon of aging transpired
when family wealth relations centered on the common patrimony in
farm or firm.
Why were there no pension funds? The most important explana-
tion is that, on account of the lower life expectancy of the times, far
fewer people outlived their period of productive employment. You
were, so to speak, much more likely to die with your boots on. I do
not want to exaggerate this point. The forty-five-year life expectancy
that prevailed a century ago is a composite figure, greatly distorted by
infant mortality. 57 Your chances of surviving to a reasonable age were
much enhanced in the last century once you had navigated the shoals
of infancy. A white male who lived to age twenty in the year 1900 had
an ultimate life expectancy of 62.2 years; a white female aged twenty
in 1900 had a life expectancy of 63.8 years; in 1980 the projected life
expectancy for whites aged twenty was 72.7 years for the male, a gain
of 10.5 years; and 79.7 for the female, a gain of 15.9 years.58 The
comparable figures for nonwhites are lower, but the rate of improve-
ment across the twentieth century has been better, especially for wo-
men.59 Thus, we see that even after we correct for infant mortality,
the diminished life expectancy of the last century was marked enough
to explain why contemporaries so seldom had occasion to talk about
what we call the retirement income problem. If you chanced to out-
live your productive years, you did not in general do it for very long.
But what of the relative handful who did need retirement support?
The well-known pattern was one of reverse transfer. Within the fam-
ily, the children, now mature, would support superannuated parents.
For propertied persons, however, this image of reverse transfer con-
ceals an important point. In the age of family-centered economic or-
ganization, the parents still owned the farm or the firm. In a sense
that defies accounting precision but that is nevertheless worth empha-
sizing, when the elders received support from the children, they were
living from their capital in the family enterprise - that enterprise to
which the children would succeed when the elders died.
57. As late as 1907,
1 in about 7 newborns died in their first year of life, whereas in 1977, 1 in 67 died then;
between the ages of one and four, I in about 17 of those born in 1907 died, whereas I in
about 360 died among those born in 1977 - representing a 21-fold reduction.
J. URQUHART & K. HEILMANN, RISK WATCH: THE ODDS OF LIFE 6 (1984).




Now return to the late twentieth century to see what has changed.
Not only have the demographics altered so that the elders are rou-
tinely surviving for long intervals beyond their years of employment,
but in consequence of the transformation in the nature of wealth, their
property has taken on a radically altered character. That family farm
or family firm that was the source of intrafamilial support in former
times has become ever more exceptional. Most parental wealth (apart
from the parents' own human capital) now takes the form of financial
assets, which embody claims upon those large-scale enterprises that
have replaced family enterprise.
B. Pension Wealth
In propertied families, today's elderly no longer expect much fi-
nancial support from their children. The shared patrimony in farm or
firm that underlay that reverse transfer system in olden times has now
largely vanished. Instead, people of means are expected to foresee the
need for retirement income while they are still in the workforce, and to
conduct a program of saving for their retirement. Typically, these
people have already undertaken one great cycle of saving and dis-
saving in their lives - that program by which they effected the invest-
ment in human capital for their children. Just as that former program
of saving was oriented toward a distinctively modern form of wealth,
human capital, so this second program centers on the other character-
istic form of twentieth-century wealth, financial assets.
A priori, we might expect that individuals would be left to save for
retirement without government guidance, much as they are left alone
to save and spend for other purposes, but that has not been the case.
Instead, the federal government has intervened by creating irresistible
tax incentives to encourage people to conduct much or most of their
retirement saving in a special mode, the tax-qualified pension plan.
There are three crucial advantages to conducting retirement saving
through a tax-qualified pension plan. First, most contributions to the
plan are tax-deferred. 60 When my employer contributes to a qualified
pension or profit-sharing plan on my behalf, or when I contribute to a
defined contribution plan such as a 401(k) or, in the case of academic
personnel, a 403(b), I am saving with pretax dollars. If I am in the 25-
percent bracket, the Treasury is contributing to my pension savings
plan 25 cents in foregone taxation for my 75 cents in foregone
consumption.
The second great tax advantage is that the earnings on qualified
60. See I.R.C. § 404(a) (West Supp. 1987).
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plan investments accrue and compound on a tax-deferred basis.6t It is
not until the employee retires and begins to receive distributions of his
pension savings that he pays income tax on the sums distributed. The
third major advantage associated with pension taxation is that, be-
cause most retirees have lower taxable income in their retirement years
than in their peak earning years, they find that distributions from pen-
sion accounts are usually taxed at lower marginal rates. As the
progressivity of the income tax has abated in recent years, however,
this attribute of the system has become less significant.
As a matter of tax policy, it is open to serious question whether
Congress should be granting the level of tax subsidy for pension saving
that it now does, 62 but that is a topic for another day. The present
point is that the tax attractions of conducting retirement saving
through the medium of a tax-qualified pension plan are simply over-
whelming. These advantages explain why employers incur the regula-
tory costs incident to sponsoring these plans; and why employees,
especially those in higher tax brackets, 63 prefer to take compensation
in the form of pension saving rather than cash wages. The private
pension system - this two-trillion-dollar savings scheme - is tax
driven.64
C. Annuitization Eliminates Succession
From the standpoint of our interest in the patterns of family
wealth transmission, what is especially important about the pension
system is that it has been deliberately designed to promote lifetime
exhaustion of the accumulated capital. The same body of federal law
that encourages pension saving also tries to ensure that pension wealth
will be consumed over the lives of the worker and his spouse.65 I do
not mean to say that the federal policy in favor of lifetime consump-
tion of retirement savings cannot be defeated for particular clients us-
ing appropriately designed plans; indeed, that is one of the major
61. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (West Supp. 1987).
62. See generally Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Inten-
tions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419 (1984).
63. Private pension coverage is strongly skewed to employees in the higher tax brackets.
Whereas 24.3% of persons earning less than $5000 per year in 1983 had pension coverage, 84.9%
of those earning $50,000 and over in that year had pension coverage. E. ANDREWS, THE
CHANGING PROFILE OF PENSIONS IN AMERICA 52 (1985). For an account of why the antidis-
crimination norm of federal tax policy fails to achieve breadth of coverage, see Wolk, supra note
62.
64. See R. IPPOLITO, supra note 47, at 16-35.
65. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1987) (pension trust not tax-qualified "unless
the plan provides that the [employee's] entire interest ... will be distributed . . . over the life of
such employee or over the lives of such employee and a designated beneficiary .... ").
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avenues of tax and estate planning for the carriage trade that has
arisen with the pension system.66 My point is simply that, in the main,
the federal policy achieves its goal, and only a negligible fraction of
pension wealth finds its way into intergenerational transfer.
The mechanism by which pension wealth is consumed is annuitiza-
tion. Just as life insurance is insurance against dying too soon, annui-
tization insures against living too long. Annuitization allows people to
consume their capital safely, that is, without fear of running out of
capital while still alive. Annuitization requires a large pool of lives,
which is achieved by various methods of aggregating the pension sav-
ings of many workers. Sometimes the employer runs the pool, some-
times an intermediary such as an insurance company or (for
multiemployer plans) a labor union. Annuitization requires assets
that can be liquidated predictably as distribution requires. That is a
trait characteristic of financial assets. Annuitization is wonderfully ef-
fective in allowing a person to consume capital without fear of out-
living his capital, but the corollary is also manifest: Accounts that
have been annuitized disappear on the deaths of the annuitants. Not
so much as a farthing remains for the heirs.
67
From this brief tour of the private pension system, I hope it will be
clear why I place this topic alongside my other main topic, wealth
transfer by means of investment in human capital, as the two central
chapters in what I have been calling the twentieth-century revolution
in family wealth transmission. Both are developments of enormous
magnitude, and both lead away from traditional wealth transfer on
death. Propertied parents used to live from their patrimony in farm or
firm and then transmit the patrimony at death. Modem parents tend
to possess nontransmissible human capital more than older forms of
property. Using their human capital to create lifetime income streams,
modem parents now undertake two cycles of saving and dissaving, one
for the children's education, the other for retirement. The investment
in the children necessarily occurs in the parents' lifetimes. And espe-
cially when the retirement saving program is channelled through the
enticing format of the qualified pension plan, the pressures for annui-
tization cause this enormous component of modem family wealth to
be largely exhausted upon the parents' deaths. Transfer on death, the
fundamental pattern of former times, is, therefore, ceasing to charac-
66. See, eg., Simmons, IRAs, IRD and Qualified Plans- What ACPC Fellows Should Know
About Employee Plan Payout Rules, 12 PROB. NOTES 294 (American College of Probate Counsel,
1987).
67. Unless the plan offers and the participant elects a mode of annuitization that provides a
guaranteed income stream (typically 10 or 20 years); in such cases, successors take the remainder
of the stream if the annuitants die within the period.
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terize the dominant wealth transmission practices of the broad middle
classes.
IV. WEALTH TRANSFER ON DEATH
A. The Carriage Trade
Decline is not extinction. The trust-and-estate bar survives, and
the main reason is the carriage trade. As I said at the outset of this
article, the revolution in family wealth transmission stops short of re-
ally substantial accumulations of wealth. The carriage trade is hugely
important. One study of data for the half century from the early 1920s
through the late 1960s focused on the top half of the top one percent
of wealth holders. Throughout the period the share of national wealth
was consistently above 20%.68 Another study reporting on more re-
cent data indicates that as of 1983, the top 840,000 households each
possessed wealth of $1.4 million or more. According to computations
that originated in Democratic party policy circles and whose accuracy
has been questioned, this group of households accounted for 42% of
the country's net wealth. 69 These calculations presuppose that finan-
cial instruments, business interests, and real property are the only im-
portant components of wealth. Because this way of measuring wealth
excludes the capitalized value of the income streams generated by
human capital, and because it excludes the capitalized value of the
private-pension and Social Security income streams, it materially over-
states the disparity between the top wealth holders and the rest of the
populace.70 These calculations also overlook what economists call the
life-cycle effect: University of Michigan law students who will have
six-figure incomes within a decade are currently reckoned as paupers.
Nevertheless, the underlying point is undeniable. The top sliver of
wealth holders is indeed very affluent, and among them the need for
estate planning services will continue unabated.
To be sure, the transformation in the nature of property has af-
fected great wealth holders as well as small. The family enterprise is
less common, the portfolio of financial assets more prevalent. But the
68. Smith & Franklin, The Concentration of Personal Wealth, 1922-1969, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 162, 163-65 (1974).
69. DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, U.S. CONGRESS, THE CON-
CENTRATION OF WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES: TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF
WEALTH AMONG AMERICAN FAMILIES 23-26 (1986) [hereinafter TRENDS IN WEALTH DISTRI-
BUTION]. For skepticism about this computation, see Eubank, A.D. 2001: Estate Planning in the
Future, in THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL PHILIP E. HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE
PLANNING ch. 20, at 20-4 to 20-11 (J. Gaubatz ed. 1987).
70. See Boskin, An Economist's Perspective on Estate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAM-
ILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 56, 57-58 (E. Halbach ed. 1977).
[Vol. 86:722
Family Wealth Transmission
changes in the patterns of wealth transfer that I have been describing
for the middle and upper-middle classes are much less important for
the very well-to-do. As regards the investment in human capital that
preoccupies the middle classes, I have already made the point that
because the amount of educational investment that can be made in any
one set of children is constrained, the educational expenditures that
loom so large for conventionally propertied families constitute for dy-
nastic wealth holders a much smaller drain on family wealth.
Likewise, the qualified pension-plan account is not an acceptable
vehicle for great fortunes. Only earned income, not investment in-
come, is eligible for qualified-plan tax deferral. Furthermore, section
415 of the Internal Revenue Code sets ceilings on the amount of sav-
ing that anyone is allowed to do within a qualified-plan account. Cur-
rently, the ceiling is $30,000 per year in saving for defined contribution
plans; for defined benefit plans, the cap applies when the annual benefit
reaches $90,000 per year.71 For people of middle-class and even up-
per-middle-class means, these ceilings scarcely pinch, but for the really
well-to-do, such ceilings represent a significant barrier. The simple
truth is that dynastic wealth cannot be stuffed into a pension account.
B. The Middle Market
Turning to the middle and upper-middle classes, we can identify a
variety of factors that explain why the trust-and-estate lawyer survives
even where he can no longer thrive. The personal circumstances of
some propertied decedents fall outside the prototype that I have de-
scribed - for example, people who are childless, or whose employers
did not offer much opportunity for pension saving. But even people
who fully experience the two cycles of saving and dissaving that I have
described will have additional property outside the pension accounts.
This wealth is likely to comprise both financial assets and real estate,
especially residential real estate, although much of that real estate is
held in probate-avoiding forms of concurrent ownership. As of 1983,
residential realty accounted for about 30% of the gross wealth of
American families.72 Data from 1975 indicates that over 70% of
Americans aged between sixty-three and sixty-nine owned their
homes; almost 80% of the elderly owned their homes free of mort-
gage.73 I do not have good data on the nonresidential wealth of the
71. I.R.C. § 415(b)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
72. TRENDS IN WEALTH DISTRIBUTIoN, supra note 69, at 20-21.




elderly, but I would certainly stipulate that their aggregate holdings
are extensive.
Whether the relative affluence of the present generation of Ameri-
can elders is likely to be reproduced in the future is a harder question.
Americans who came of age during and shortly after World War II
experienced unexampled prosperity. The generation that won the war
profited hugely from the fifteen-year Pax Americana that endured
roughly from 1952 to 1967. As the war-torn economies of Europe and
the Far East rebuilt, America's comparative advantage declined, and
our wealth has declined apace. Furthermore, the generation that
benefitted from the one-time windfall of postwar prosperity also re-
ceived the one-time windfall of the huge increase in Social Security
transfer payments. It is worth remembering that as late as 1950, the
average monthly Social Security benefit for a retiree was only $29.03.74
In October 1987 that benefit was $491.75. 75 The present generation of
elderly voted itself a multi-trillion-dollar treat in the form of transfer
payments extracted from succeeding generations. 76 We should not be
surprised that some of these people have some wealth left over to
transmit at death.
Quite apart from whether future generations of elderly will be able
to accumulate a$ much wealth as the present generation, it is impor-
tant to recognize that much of the nonpension wealth that survives for
transfer on death in middle- and upper-middle-class families is deeply
affected by another great trend that has fundamentally diminished the
lawyerly role in wealth transfer on death. I refer to the explosive
growth in the use of nonprobate modes of transfer. Residential real
estate is widely held in joint tenancy, under which a death certificate
suffices to clear title without probate or other court proceedings. The
more interesting phenomenon is the rise of the mass will substitutes
that employ noncourt transfer systems - life insurance, pension accu-
mulations prior to annuitization, POD accounts, joint accounts, and
so forth. The numbers for life insurance alone are staggering. In
1986, American insurers had $6.72 trillion of insurance in force, aver-
aging $81,200 per insured family; payments on death in that year
74. Id. at 13.
75. Social Security in Review, Soc. SECURITY BULL., Jan. 1988, at 2, 3.
76. Social Security has been described as a "Ponzi scheme," because
the first generation receives benefits without having had to finance the retirement of its im-
mediate predecessors....
• In contrast, middle-income household heads in the cohort to be born in 1990 are
projected over their lifetimes to lose, on net, roughly $60,000 in present value as a conse-
quence of participating in Social Security.
Kotlikoff, Deficit Delusion, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1986, at 53, 62.
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amounted to $19.5 billion.77
The financial intermediaries who market financial assets (especially
insurance companies and banks, but also investment companies, bro-
kerage houses, stock issuers, and others) have taken to offering trans-
fer-on-death services because they have a comparative advantage in
doing so.
Financial intermediation is, as the term signifies, intrinsically adminis-
trative. Administrators intermediate between savers and borrowers, be-
tween passive owners and active users of capital. Pooling wealth and
servicing the resulting liabilities involves recurrent transactions and
communications. Once a bureaucracy appropriate to such tasks is in
operation, only a scant adaptation is necessary to extend its functions
and procedures to include the transfer of account balances on death.
78
The main financial intermediaries have become powerful free-market
competitors, competing against the probate system in arranging for
wealth transfer on death.
The nonprobate system takes on a heightened significance when
viewed from the perspective of the themes that I have been sounding
in this article. Even when middle-class or upper-middle-class people
emerge from their two cycles of saving and dissaving in possession of
other wealth, and even when they hold that wealth until death, much
of it - indeed most of it - now passes to survivors with little or no
need for lawyer-administered transfer-on-death services. I do not
mean to imply that lay persons are well advised to do their own estate
planning through the medium of the nonprobate system. Quite to the
contrary, I think that one of the worst consequences of the nonprobate
system is that it tempts people into the mistake of thinking that avoid-
ing probate is the equivalent of estate planning. Lay persons rarely
understand the range of contingencies that can arise in the wealth
transfer process - for example, issues like lapse; and the nonprobate
system often handles those contingencies less well than the probate
process.
79
Nonprobate property is, of course, still subject to the federal trans-
fer taxes, 80 but the drastic 1981 reduction in those taxes has dimin-
ished the demand for estate planning services among the middle and
upper-middle classes.
Apace with the decline in demand for lawyer-assisted planning
77. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1987 LIF, INSURANCE FACT BOOK UPDATE
4 (1987).
78. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1108, 1119 (1984).
79. Id. at 1135-40.
80. See I.R.C. §§ 2001 et seq. (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
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services has been the diminution of demand for lawyer-assisted trans-
fer services even when probate or administration of an estate must oc-
cur. The probate reform movement of the 1960s, epitomized in the
Uniform Probate Code's provisions for simplified probate" and for
nonadministration of very small estates, 82 has further limited the
scope for court-operated transfer services.
83
A comprehensive account of the patterns by which inter vivos
wealth transfers now displace transfers that in former times occurred
on death would also embrace the huge twentieth-century increase in
the divorce rate. Dissolution upon divorce has replaced dissolution
upon death as the predominant mode of terminating a marriage.8 4
The property transfers that divorce precipitates, both transfers to
spouses and transfers to children, supplant in some measure a wealth
transfer process that used to occur through succession.
V. CONCLUSION
Increasingly, estate planning services for the middle and upper-
middle classes have the quality of contingency planning. The client is
motivated largely by concern to make arrangements for his family in
the unlikely event that he should die prematurely. He does not expect
property actually to pass under the instrument he executes. In this
sense, he views his estate plan somewhat like his term life insurance
policy. It is catastrophe insurance, worth having even though it is
unlikely to be needed. 85
The modern expectation is that for middle-class wealth, the main
81. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-301 et seq., 8 U.L.A. 245 (1982).
82. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-1201 to 3-1204, 8 U.L.A. 412-16 (1982).
83. For empirical data on the levels of probate (including administration of intestate estates)
from an extensive study conducted under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation, see Stein
& Fierstein, The Demography of Probate Administration, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 54, 61 (1985). In
a five-state study conducted in the mid-1970s, "the average percentage of decedents' estates that
underwent estate administration ranged from twenty percent in California to thirty-four percent
in Massachusetts .... " Id. (Compare earlier data of this sort, conveniently collected in
Fletcher, Probate in England: A Blueprint for the Future? (Book Review), 46 WASH. L. REV.
619, 624 & n.14 (1971).) Simplified probate and administration procedures significantly reduced
the percentage of estates requiring full-dress administration. Stein & Fierstein, supra, at 75-77.
The authors emphasize that a key finding of their study is that "relatively few decedents leave a
substantial estate requiring judicial administration." Id. at 87.
84. The official comment to the Uniform Marital Property Act reports that, of marriages
terminated in 1979, 42.77% were terminated by death, compared to 57.23% that ended in di-
vorce. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY Acr prefatory note (1983).
85. The contingent quality of the estate plan must help explain the mind-set that inclines
many a client to resist paying for legal services in the estate planning department at rates compa-
rable to those charged down the hall in the corporate or litigation departments. Since the client
does not plan to use this estate planning scheme to transfer wealth within his family if he lives as
long as he expects, he feels that he should not have to pay real money for it.
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intergenerational transfer will occur in mid-life, in the form of educa-
tional expenditures. The characteristic wealth of later years, the in-
come streams from the public and private pension systems, do not give
rise to heirship. Thus, wealth transfer on death is ever less important
to the middle classes; and when it does occur, it is ever more likely to
be channelled through the nonprobate system. These are the great
forces that underlie the decline of the trust-and-estate bar.
So long as the carriage trade abides, the trust-and-estate bar will
not go the way of the blacksmith, but the precipitous decline of the
middle-class market is likely to continue. From the revolutionary
changes that have affected the family property relations of the middle
and upper-middle classes, only table scraps remain for the trust-and-
estate lawyer. The days of routine, lawyer-guided wealth-transfer-on-
death for the middle classes have largely passed.
